According to Bruno de Finetti's Representation Theorem, exchangeable beliefs over infinite sequences of observable Bernoulli quantities can be represented as mixtures of independent coin tossing experiments. Extensions of this theorem give rise to representations as mixtures of other familiar sampling distributions. This paper offers a subjectivist primer based on the premise that appreciation of these theorems enhances understanding of the subjective interpretation of probability, of its connection to the more prevalent frequentist interpretation, and of its usefulness as a context in which to view parameters, priors, and likelihoods.
Introduction
In his popular notes on the theory of choice, (Kreps, 1988, p. 145) 
opines that Bruno de
Finetti's Representation Theorem is the fundamental theorem of statistical inference. de Finetti's theorem characterizes likelihood functions in terms of symmetries and invariance. The conceptual framework begins with an infinite string of observable random quantities taking on values in a sample space Z. Then it postulates symmetries and invariance for probabilistic assignments to such strings, and finds a likelihood with the prescribed properties for finite strings of length N. This 2 Implicitly, de Finetti assumed the utility of money is linear. He and others suggested rationalizations like the "stakes are small." Separation of the concepts of "probability" and "utility" remains a controversial matter (Kadane and Winkler, 1988) . observables conditional on having observed , i.e.,
The essential building block is P(@) for a variety of arguments. The theorems discussed later put restrictions on P(@). The need for at least some restrictions is obvious since arbitrarily long finite strings will be discussed. But seemingly weak conditions on arbitrarily long finite strings can deliver striking results for finite strings, and computation of (1), only involves finite strings of data.
Predictive pdf (1) provides a family of solutions to Hume's problem. The only restriction that P(@) must satisfy is coherence, i.e., use of P(@) avoids being made a sure loser regardless of the outcomes in any betting situation (also known as avoiding Dutch Book). 2 This implies that P(@) obeys the axioms of probability (at least up to finite additivity). Whether (1) leads to good out-of-sample predictions is a different question for which there is no guaranteed affirmative answer.
Beyond coherence I consider a variety of restrictions to facilitate construction of P(@). Again, such restrictions should not be thought of as "true" or "false." They are not meant to be properties of reality; rather, they are restrictions on one's beliefs about reality. Other researchers may or may not find a particular restriction compelling. Part of the art of empirical work is to articulate restrictions that other researchers are at least willing to entertain if not outright adopt, i.e., to obtain inter-subjective agreement among a bevy of Bayesians. The simplest such restriction, exchangeability, is the topic of the next section.
(1)
Exchangeability
de Finetti assigned a fundamental role to the concept of exchangeability. Given a finite sequence suppose an individual makes the subjective judgement that the subscripts are uninformative in the sense that the individual specifies the same marginal distributions for the individual random quantities identically, and similarly for all possible pairs, triplets, etc. of the random quantities. Then P(@) satisfies for all positive integers N, where B(n) (n = 1, 2, ..., N) is a permutation of the elements in {1, 2, ..., N}. Such beliefs are said to be exchangeable. In terms of the corresponding density/mass function, exchangeability implies A sequence is infinitely exchangeable iff every finite subsequence is exchangeable.
Exchangeability is one of many instances of the use of symmetry arguments in the historical development of probability (Poirier,1995, p. 17) , and more generally, in mathematics (du Sautoy, 2008) . It provides an operational meaning to the weakest possible notion of a sequence of "similar" random quantities. It is "operational" in the sense that it only requires probability assignments for observable quantities, albeit arbitrarily long sequences. Exchangeability expresses a symmetric type of ignorance: no additional information is available to distinguish among the quantities. A sequence of Bernoulli quantities Z n (n = 1, 2, ..., N) in Z = {0, 1} is exchangeable iff the probability assigned to particular sequences does not depend on the order of zeros and ones. For example, if N = 3 and the trials are exchangeable, then the sequences 011, 101, and 110 are assigned the same probability.
For applications of exchangeability in economics, see (McCall, 1991) . (Schervish, 1995, pp.7-8) argued that a judgment of exchangeability is a confession by the observer that he cannot distinguish among the quantities, since he believes they are homogeneous. (Gelman et al., 1995, p. 124) remarked: "In practice, ignorance implies exchangeability. Generally, the less we know about the problem, the more confident we can make claims about exchangeability." Arguing against an exchangeability assessment is an admission of the existence of non-data based information on observables for the problem at hand.
Like iid sequences, the quantities in an exchangeable sequence are identically distributed.
However, unlike in iid sequences, such quantities need not be independent for exchangeable beliefs.
For example, if the quantities are a sample (without replacement) of size N from a finite population of unknown size N * > N, then they are dependent and exchangeable. Also, the possible dependency in the case of exchangeable beliefs is what enables the researcher to learn from experience using (1).
Whereas iid sampling is the foundation of frequentist econometrics, exchangeability is the foundation for Bayesian econometrics. Both serve as the basis for further extensions to incorporate heterogeneity and dependency across observations. For example, in Section 6 exchangeability will be weakened to partial exchangeability and a time series model (a first-order Markov process) arises for the likelihood.
In the Bernoulli case, the sample space Z of has 2 N elements, and it takes 2 N -1 numbers to specify the probabilities of all possible outcomes. In the case of exchangeability, however, the symmetry reduces this number dramatically. All that are needed are the N probabilities 1994, p. 113) , the probability of any outcome in which r specified Z i s occur and the other N -r do not occur is Therefore, probabilities of all possible outcomes can be expressed in terms of N of the q k s. The difference 2 N -1 -N grows rapidly as N increases, suggesting the power of the exchangeability assumption. Exchangeability is also applicable to continuous quantities as the next example shows. (2) follows (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 172-173) . In other words, Theorem1 implies it is as if, given 1 = 2, are iid Bernoulli trials with likelihood function ‹(2; z), and where the probability 1 of a success is assigned a prior cdf F(2) that can be interpreted as the researcher's beliefs about the long-run relative frequency of # 2 as N 6 4. From de Finetti's standpoint, both the parameter 1 and the notion of independence are "mathematical fictions" implicit in the researcher's subjective assessment of arbitrarily long sequences of observable successes and failures. The "P-almost surely," or equivalently, "with probability one" qualification on the existence of 1 in Theorem 1refers to the researcher's predictive beliefs [i.e., the left-hand side of (2)] which may not be reflected in reality. de Finetti's Theorem commits the researcher to believe almost surely to the existence of 1 in his/her personal world, not
necessarily in the physical universe. In standard cases where F(2) is absolutely continuous with pdf f(2), (2) can be replaced with the more familiar form
The pragmatic value of de Finetti's Theorem depends on whether it is easier to assess the left-hand side p(z) of (3), which only involves observable quantities, or instead, the integrand on the right-hand side of (3) which involves the likelihood, the prior, and the mathematical fiction 2. Most researchers think in terms of the right-hand side. Non-Bayesians implicitly do so with a degenerate distribution that treats 1 equal to a constant 2 o with probability one, i.e., a degenerate "prior" distribution for 1 at the "true value" 2 o . I am promoting an attitude that emerges from the left-hand side of (3), but which can be used to help researchers work on the right-hand side of (3).
de Finetti's theorem suggests an isomorphism between two worlds, one involving only observables z and the other involving the parameter 1. de Finetti put parameters in their proper perspective: they are mathematical constructs that provide a convenient index for a probability distribution, they induce conditional independence for a sequence of observables, and they are "lubricants" for fruitful thinking and communication. Their "real-world existence" is a question only of metaphysical importance.
Example 2: Suppose N Bernoulli trials yield r ones and N -r zeros. Assume F(2) is absolutely continuous with pdf f(2). Applying Theorem 1 to the numerator and denominator of (1) [see Poirier (1995, p. 216) ] with M = 1 yields the predictive probability ball selected is red or black. Then the Z n (n = 1, 2, 3, ...) are infinitely exchangeable and comprise a Polya urn process. However, not all urn processes are exchangeable. Neither can all exchangeable processes can be represented as urn processes. See (Hill, Lane and Sudderth, 1987) . (4) where , and is the posterior pdf of 1. From (4) The existence of the prior F(@) is a conclusion of Theorem 1, not an assumption. The updating of prior beliefs captured in (4) corresponds to Bayes' Theorem. Although are conditionally independent given 1 = 2, unconditional on 1 they are dependent. Putting further restrictions on the observable Bernoulli quantities beyond infinite exchangeability can help pin down the prior F(@). For example, the assumption that correspond to draws from a Polya urn process implies the prior F(@) belongs to the conjugate beta family (Freedman, 1965) . 3 (Hill, Lane and Sudderth, 1987) proved that an exchangeable urn process can only be Polya, Bernoulli iid, or deterministic.
Example 3: Consider the Bernoulli case in Example 2 for a Polya urn. Then for some hyperparameters and the implied prior for 1 is the conjugate beta density Posterior pdf (4) is with hyperparameters and . Note that the posterior mean of 1 is , demonstrating posterior linearity in (Diaconis and Ylvisaker, 1979, pp. 279-280) with mean and variance . Specifically, (Chaloner and Duncan, 1983) argued (5) (assuming > 1 and > 1) for elicitation in terms of the mode of (5) and the ratios of probability at m relative to m -1 and m + 1. In contrast, (Geisser, 1984) discussed "noninformative" priors for 2 including two members of the beta family other than the uniform: the limiting improper prior of Haldane ( = = 0) and the proper prior of Jeffreys ( = = ½).
For extension to the multinomial case, see (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 176-177) . (Johnson, 1924 ) gave a predictive argument for the multinomial case, similar to Bayes' argument in the binomial case.
Nonparametric Representation Theorem
de Finetti's Representation Theorem has been extended to cover exchangeable beliefs involving random variables more complicated than Bernoulli random variables. The initial nonparametric case for Euclidean spaces was studied by (de Finetti, 1938) . (Hewitt and Savage, 1955) extended the result to arbitrary compact Hausdorff spaces, and (Aldous, 1985) extended it to random elements with values in a standard Bore1 space. (Dubins and Freedman, 1979) showed that without any topological assumptions, the result need not hold. The following theorem covers the general case for real-valued exchangeable random quantities [(Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 178- 
179) outlined its proof ].
Theorem 2 (General Representation Theorem): Consider an infinitely exchangeable sequence of real-valued random quantities with probability measure P(@). Then there exists a probability measure F over ö, the space of all distribution functions on U, such that the joint cdf of has the form (6) where and is the empirical distribution function corresponding to . #
In other words, it is as if the observations are independent conditional on Q, an unknown cdf (in effect an infinite-dimensional parameter), with a belief distribution F(@) for Q, having the operational interpretation in (6) of what we believe the empirical distribution function would look like for a large sample.
Theorem 2 is a general existence theorem. Unfortunately, it is of questionable pragmatic value because it is hard to think of specifying a prior on all probabilities on U. (Diaconis and Freedman, 1986 ) discussed the difficulties of specifying priors over infinite dimensional spaces.
Also see (Sims, 1971) , (Schervish, 1995, pp. 52-72) and (Ferguson, 1974) . Therefore, in the next section attention turns to additional restrictions required to specify intermediate familiar finitedimensional parametric sampling models. Unlike in the simple Bernoulli case of Section 3, however, predictive arguments for choosing particular priors are harder to obtain. (Diaconis and Freedman, 1981, p. 205) noted that an equivalent formulation of exchangeability of Bernoulli random quantities is the following. For every N, given the sum S N = s, the joint distribution of is uniformly distributed over the sequences having s ones and (N -s) zeros. In other words, are exchangeable iff the partial sums are sufficient with an "equiprobable" conditional distribution for Z 1 , Z 2 , ..., Z N given S N = s. This section explores invariance and sufficiency restrictions that deliver familiar sampling distributions in cases more complicated than Bernoulli variables. In the process these restrictions on observables will yield parametric families and operationally useful results falling between Theorems 1 and 2.
Generalizations
An example of such a restriction is spherical symmetry. Beliefs regarding z are spherically symmetric iff p(z) = p(Az) for any N×N orthogonal matrix A (i.e., A -1 = AN) satisfying A4 N = 4 N (i.e., which preserves the unit N-vector 4 N ). This restriction amounts to rotational invariance of the coordinate system which fixes distances from the origin. Exchangeability is one form of spherical symmetry since permutation is one form of orthogonal transformation. for any N×N orthogonal matrix A, not requiring AN4 N = 4 N , and strengthening the exchangeability assumption to infinite exchangeability, leads to the following theorem [see (Schoenberg, 1938) , (Freedman, 1962b) , (Kingman, 1972) , and (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 182) ]. 
leading to the same value of When infinite exchangeability is augmented with centered spherical symmetry, then the familiar normal random sampling model with unknown mean and unknown precision emerges in the following theorem of (Smith, 1981) . For a proof, see (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 183-185) . Also see (Eaton, Fortini, and Regazzini,1993, p. 4) for an important qualification. (9) and (10), and with prior distribution F(@) in (8). As in the Bernoulli case, adding the restriction of linearity of the poster mean in terms of implies a conjugate normal-gamma prior.
Example 5: Under the conditions of Theorem 4 and a conjugate normal-gamma prior density (3) is the centered spherically symmetric multivariate-t pdf . P
The multivariate analog of Theorem 4 follows [see (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 186) and (Diaconis, Eaton, and Lauritzen, 1992) ].
Theorem 5 (Multivariate Normal Sampling):
Consider an infinitely exchangeable sequence of real-valued random vectors in U K with cdf P(@), such that for any N and c 0 U K , the random quantities cNZ 1 , cNZ 2 , ..., cNZ N are characterized by centered spherical symmetry. Then the predictive beliefs P(z) are as if were iid multivariate normal vectors, conditional on a random mean : and covariance matrix E, with a distribution over : and E induced by P(@), where
Additional results based on infinite exchangeability and particular invariance properties yield other familiar sampling models. Two examples of characterizations of discrete distributions over nonnegative integers are:
(a) (Freedman, 1962b) showed that if for every N, the joint distribution of , given the sum is multinomial on N-tuples with uniform probabilities equal to N -1 (the Maxwell-4 Alternative formulations are possible. For example, (Diaconis and Ylvisaker, 1985) showed that in the case of an infinitely exchangeable sequence of positive real quantities with probability measure P(@) that exhibit a certain "lack of memory" property with respect to the origin, then p(@) has a representation as a mixture of iid exponential random quantities. A similar result holds for an infinitely exchangeable sequence of positive integers leading to a representation as a mixture of iid geometric random quantities. In both of the latter cases, the predictive "lack of memory" property is reminiscent of similar properties for the parametric exponential and geometric distributions. See (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 187-190) for more details.
Boltzman distribution), then it is as if
are iid Poison random variables.
(b) (Diaconis and Freedman, 1981, p. 214) . (Diaconis and Freedman, 1981, p. 210) noted that this condition is necessary and sufficient for the representation that are
iid uniform over the interval [0, 1], with a prior distribution for 1.
(d) (Diaconis and Freedman, 1987) showed that if for every N, given the sum S N = s, the joint distribution of is uniformly distributed over the simplex {Z n $ 0, s}, then it is as if are iid exponential random variables.
4
(e) (Singpurwalla, 2006, p. 54) noted that if for every N, given the sum S N = s, the joint distribution of is uniformly distributed over the simplex { $ 0, s}, then it is as if are iid gamma random variables with pdf (f) (Singpurwalla, 2006, p. 55) noted that if the uniformity in (e) is over the simplex {Z n $ 0, 5 Indeed the method of (Chaloner and Duncan, 1983 ) discussed in Example 3 is an example.
}, then it is as if are iid Weibull random variables.
Further restrictions on to analytically derive the prior distributions are difficult to find once we leave the Bernoulli sample space of Section 3. A more common approach is to elicit moments and quantiles for the left-hand side of (3), and assuming a parametric family for f(@) (usually conjugate), to then back-out a prior on the right-hand side of (3). Usually the process is iterative. 5 Rationalization for restricting attention to conjugate priors is provided by (Diaconis and Ylvisaker, 1979) who characterized conjugate priors through the property that the posterior expectation of the mean parameter of Z n , E[E(Z n *1 = 2)*Z n = z n ], is linear in z n . While not analytical, the approach is predictively motivated.
There are many other representation theorems available. (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 215-216) outline how two-way ANOVA specifications and hierarchical specifications can be rationalized. But these are only partly predictively motivated. (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 219-222) cover binary choice models, growth curves, and regression. In these extensions, the parameter 1 becomes a function of the regressors, but the specification of 1(@) is done in a ad hoc manner to provide common specifications instead of providing transparent restrictions on observables for the left-hand side of a representation theorem. (Diaconis, Eaton, Lauritzen, 1992 ) characterize normal models for regression and ANOVA in terms of symmetry or sufficiency restrictions. (Arnold, 1979) considered multivariate regression models with exchangeable errors.
Finally, although de Finetti's theorem does not hold exactly for finite sequences, it does hold approximately for sufficiently large finite sequence. (Diaconis and Freedman, 1980) showed that for a binary exchangeable sequence of length K which can be extended to an exchangeable sequence of length N, then de Finetti's theorem "almost" holds in the sense that the total variation distance between the distribution of Z 1 , Z 2 , ..., Z K and the approximating mixture is # 2K/N. (Diaconis et al., 1992, p. 292 ) provided a finite version of (Dawid, 1978) . (Diaconis and Freedman , 1987 ) discussed numerous extensions with K/N continuing to play a key role. Finite versions of de Finetti's theorem for Markov chains are given by (Diaconis and Freedman, 1980) and (Zaman, 1986) .
Partial Exchangeability
Exchangeability involves complete symmetry in beliefs. Often such beliefs are not warranted across all observables, but are reasonable for subsets. This leads to partial exchangeability. Partial exchangeability takes on a variety of guises [see (de Finetti, 1938) , (Aldous, 1981) and (Diaconis and Freedman, 1980, 1981) ], but an essential ingredient is that the sequence is broken down into exchangeable subsequences. For example, suppose are the employment status after undergoing job training. If both males and females are included, one might be reluctant to make a judgement of exchangeability for the entire sequence of results. However, within subsequences defined by gender, an assumption of exchangeability might be reasonable.
Alternatively, consider the case of Markov chains for Bernoulli quantities as initially studied by (de Finetti, 1938) and then (Freedman, 1962a) . Consider three subsequences: the first observation, observations following a zero, and observations following a one. Two binary sequences are said to be equivalent if they begin with the same symbol and have the same number of transitions from 0 to 0, 0 to 1, 1 to 0, and 1 to 1. A probability on binary sequences is partially exchangeable iff it assigns equal probability to equivalent strings. (Freedman, 1962a) showed that a stationary partially exchangeable process is a mixture of Markov chains. (Diaconis and Freedman, 1980a) eliminated the stationary assumption. To get a mixture of Markov chains in this case, infinitely many returns to the starting state are needed. Extensions to countable situations are straightforward, but extensions to more general spaces are more complex [see (Diaconis, 1988) ].
Yet another form of partial exchangeability is described by (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. from that sequence. Therefore, unrestrictedly infinitely exchangeability involves a conditional irrelevance judgement. With this definition in hand, the following theorem of (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 212-213) can be proved. To appreciate Theorem 6, consider the case of M = 2 subsequences as do (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, pp. 214, 223) . Then Theorem 6 implies we can proceed as if (i) the (m = 1, 2) are judged to be independent Bernoulli random quantities conditional on 1 m (m = 1, 2), (ii) 1 1 and 1 2 have bivariate cdf F(2 1 , 2 2 ), and according to the SLLN, (m = 1, 2) P-almost surely. Specification of F(2 1 , 2 2 ) depends on the application at hand. Four possibilities are:
(i) belief that knowledge of the limiting relative frequency for one of the sequences will not change beliefs about the other sequence (prior beliefs about 1 1 and 1 2 are independent), (ii) belief that the limiting relative frequency of the second sequence is necessarily greater than for the first sequence implies F(2 1 , 2 2 ) is zero outside of 0 # 2 1 < 2 2 # 1, (iii) belief that there is a positive non-unitary probability that the limits of the two sequences are the same, and (iv) belief that the long-run frequencies 1 m (m = 1, 2) are themselves exchangeable leading to a hierarchical model. The mathematics behind de Finetti's Theorem and its generalizations has many cousins. (Diaconis and Freedman, 1981) discussed the mathematical similarity to statistical-mechanical studies of "Gibbs states". (Lauritzen, 1988) developed extreme point models in the language of projective systems. (Ladha, 1993) used de Finetti's Theorem to relax Condorcet's assumption of independent voting while preserving the result that a majority of voters is more likely than any single voter to choose the better of two alternatives. The mathematics of representation theorems is both deep and broad.
Conclusions
"... one could say that for him (de Finetti) Bayesianism represents the crossroads where pragmatism and empiricism meet subjectivism. He thinks one needs to be Bayesian in order to be subjectivist, but on the other hand subjectivism is a choice to be made if one embraces a pragmatist and empiricist philosophy." (Galavotti, 2001, p. 165) I believe the case has been made for Bayesianism in the sense of de Finetti. I have promoted a subjective attitude emerging from the left-hand side of (3), but which can be used to help researchers work on the more customary right-hand side. This change of emphasis from parameters to observables puts the former in a subsidiary role. Less fascination with parameters can be healthy.
The prior f(@), which is implied (not assumed) by a representation theorem, is always proper. This rules out the usual priors used in objective Bayesian analysis [see (Berger, 2004) ]. But interestingly, exchangeability, which is an admission of no additional information regarding otherwise similar observable quantities, implies the use of a proper prior for the mathematical fiction 1. To pin down this prior further requires additional assumptions about observable sequences (e.g., the Polya urn assumption in Example 3).
If the researcher finds it more convenient to think in terms of the right-hand side of (3) (say, because the researcher has a theoretical framework in which to interpret 1), then by all means elicit a personal prior for 1 or consider the sensitivity of the posterior with respect to professional viewpoints of interest defined parametrically. But given that most people find prior choice difficult, a representation theorem provides an alternative way to use subjective information about observables to facilitate prior choice for 1.
Even when a representation theorem is not available for a given parametric likelihood (say, because it is unclear what restrictions on the left-had side of (3) would be sufficient to imply this choice of likelihood), the spirit of this discussion has hopefully not been lost on the reader.
Representation theorems reflect a healthy attitude toward parametric likelihoods: they are not intended to be "true" properties of reality, but rather useful windows for viewing the observable world, communicating with other researchers, and making inferences regarding future observables.
